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IN THE SUPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
Case No.

-vs.-

8419

vVILBUR J. STITES,
Appellwnt.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts as its Statement of Facts the
first five paragraphs of Appellant's Brief.

STA11 EMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S :\fOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION.
1
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POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND IN
ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
POINT III
TESrl,IMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED
WAS NOT IMPROPER.
POINT IV
TESTI~IONY OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSIONS
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.

POINT V
rrHE COPY OF CORPORATION .MINUTES WAS
AD~tJ:ISSIBLE.

POINT VI
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S ;\IOrriO~ TO QFASH THE INFOR_MATION.
Section 77-21-8 of our Code of Criminal Procedure
provides two principal methods of charging an offense.
The part applicable to this appeal reads as follows:
'' ( 1) rrht' infornlation or indictment may
charge, and iH valid and sufficient if it charges
the offense for whieh the defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the following ways :
* *' *
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''(b) By stating so much of the definition of
the offense, either in terms of the common law
or of the statute defining the offense or in terms
of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice
of what offense is intended to be charged."
The statute (76-13-3, U.C.A. 1953) under which the
appellant \vas charged reads in pertinent part:

"* * * and every director, officer, agent or member of any corporation or association who embezzles, abstracts or wilfully misapplies any of
the money, funds or credits of the corporation or
association; * * * is guilty of a felony, and shall
be imprisoned in the state prison for not less
than one year nor more than ten years, and be
fined in any sum less than $10,000.''
The information in this case states:
"That on or about the 3rd day of December,
1954, at the County of Cache, State of Utah, the
said defendant did then and there as a director
and an officer of a corporation, to-wit a director
~lind president of Valley Motor Company, a Utah
corporation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misapply money of the said corporation in the
amount of $2,000.00 which he had received from
Robert S. Budge on the sale of an autombile to
said Robert S. Budge which was the property of
the said corporation."
The information in a criminal proceeding must be
sufficiently definite to ( 1) notify the defendant of the
charge against him so as to enable him to prepare his
defense, (2) identify the offense so that the defendant
can successfully interpose a double jeopardy plea in the
event of a second prosecution thereon, and (3) apprise
3
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the court of the issues before it so that it can properly
rule on questions of evidence and determine the sufficiency thereof. Leasure v. State, ______ Okla. ______ , 275 P.
2d 344. Additionally, the information must contain all
of the elements of the offense charged. The test of
sufficiency is not whether the information could have
been made more certain, but rather whether it meets
the foregoing requisites. Sandy v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 80,
231 P. 2d 374.
The complaint made of the information in this case
was similarly advanced against the information in the
case of State v. Pritchett, 87 Utah 104, 34 P. 2d 704, rev.
on reh. 87 Utah 109, 48 P. 2d 451. In its first opinion
this Honorable Court held in favor of the defendant,
setting forth its reasons in the following language:
"It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction
that an information to withstand an attack by a
general demurrer or motion in arrest of judgment
must apprise the accused of the crime charged
with such reasonable certainty that he can make
his defense and after verdict and judgment thereon protect himself against further prosecution
for the same offense. It is also well settled by
numerous decisions of this court that where a
statute uses general or generic terms in defining
a crime, it is not sufficient that the information
merely charged the crime in the same general or
generic terms as those used in the statutory definition. The particular ads which the accused is
charged with haYing committed must be alleged
in the information. • * •
''It will he observed that the statute under
. which this prosecution is had uses general or
generic terms in defining the crime of misapply4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing credits of a corporation. That crime may be
committed in several different ways and by the
use of various means. The accused is charged
with using and passing a bank check or draft in
the sum of $1,642.36. The only language contained
in the information which is descriptive of the
check or draft is the amount thereof. It is alleged
that the instrument was 'drawn on or against' a
credit at the National Copper Bank from which
it may be inferred that the National Copper Bank
was the drawee of the check or draft. The information is silent as to the date of the check or
draft, as to its maker or payee. * * *"
Upon rehearing, however, and after more extensive
consideration of the point, this Court reversed its prior
holding, explaining its decision in part in the following
language:

'' * * * A re-examination of the information convinces us that the defendant was specifically
charged with unlawfully misapplying credits of a
corporation, and that we therefore misconceived
the nature of the charge. The gist of the offense
is that of misapplying credits, and if that result
is accomplished, the offense is complete irrespective of the means employed. * * * ''
( 48 P. 2d at 452)
The only difference between the information in the
Pritchett Case and that under consideration here is that
the former dealt with misapplying credit of a corporation, whereas the charge here is misapplying money of
a corporation-an immaterial distinction. This is the
only case the respondent has been able to find in which
the Court has passed on a charge laid under the '' misapplication'' statute.

5
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The reasons for sustaining the information in the
Pritchett Case are even more applicable to the case at
bar. rrhis appellant was notified that he was charged
with wilfully misapplying, as an officer and director of
a corporation, money of the corporation; that the particular money in question was a $2,000 sum received
from Robert S. Budge; that the money was property of
the corporation as a result of the sale of an automobile
to Budge; and that the automobile was property of the
corporation. Additionally, the time and place of the
offense were specified. Neither the provisions of our
State and Federal Constitutions nor the decided cases
require more definiteness than this.
In broad view, there is only one way in which this
offense can be committed-by using for some other purpose corporate money which under the law must be used
for a corporate purpose. State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365,
120 P. 2d 285. Yet, like any other offense, it may be
accomplished in detail by a variety of methods.
The offense of robbery offers an example. It is
settled law in Utah that the short form information is
sufficient to charge robbery. State r. Hill, 100 Utah
456, 116 P. 2d 392; State r. Landrum, 3 Ut. 2d 372, 284
P. 2d 693; and State r. Robbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P. 2d
1042. The information may state merely that AB robbed
CD. Yet, robbery ran be committed by any one of four
methods and in each category, by as many different acts
as the pleader's imagination might offer. It can be
committed by a taking from the person of the victim by
force or by threat of force; or it may be taken from his

6
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immediate presence by either of these. The force itself
may be applied by club, clenched fist, knife or flat iron;
the threat of force may accompany the brandishing of
a gun, a blackjack or a broken beer bottle. So also, in
this case, the appellant could have used the money to
buy a refrigerator, or take a vacation, or pay off a
personal debt, or for any of numberless other purposes
which he may have thought expedient at the time.
The appellant contends, however, that this information is bad because it contains no allegation of what,
specifically, he did with the money nor any statement
of what authority required him to apply it otherwise.
His brief suggests other questions which he maintains
should have been answered by the information. But, the
State is not, and properly should not, be required to
plead such matters as a part of the information. If the
appellant has any right to restrict the prosecution in its
proof, it is by means of a bill of particulars, and no
clearer case than this for its appropriateness can be
imagined. See State v. Robbins, supra.
The appellant places great stress on the holding in
State 'U. Topham, 41 Utah 39, 123 P. 888, but this Court's
subsequent views of the Tophmn Case suggests a distinction. As explained in State v. Zaharapoulos, 60 Utah
2-±4, 208 p. 493 :

"* * * The case at bar is not at all analogous, and
is readily distinguishable from the decided cases
relied upon by defendant. In those cases it was
charged that the offenses had been committed in
divers ways. As an illustration, take the Topham
Case, wherein it was charged that the offense was
7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

committed 'by promises and threats and by divers
devices and schemes,' without stating any specific
act or thing done on the part of the accused, or the
kind or nature of the promises, threats, devices,
and schemes, or any facts or circumstances whatever whereby the accused might know the kind or
character of the acts constituting the offense with
which she was charged. In the present case the
defendant is charged with nothing more than one
act, that of 'knowingly permitting prostitutes to
solicit patronage in their [his] place of business,'
during a certain period, 'on the 25th day of February, A.D. 1921, and thence continuing until and
including the 4th day of March A.D. 1921.' The
exact period of time, place, and names of the
prostitutes who were permitted to solicit patronage for prostitution were specifically stated in
the charge. What more was needed to advise the
defendant of the nature of the charge against
him~ The manner in which the women prostitutes
solicited patronage of men for the immoral purposes of prostitution was wholly immaterial. The
gist of the offense was defendant's permitting
them to solicit in his place of business, the Alco
Hotel. These facts constituting the essential elements of the crime with which defendant was
charged ·were specifically pleaded, together with
the time, place, and names of the persons permitted to solicit. Every requirement of our statutes
in a ease of this kind was complied with.''
In People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 P. 75, this Honorable
Court sustained an indictment which was attacked by
the defendant as insufficient. The language of that
opinion is appropriate to this issue. It reads:

'' * * * It is sufficient if the charge be stated with
so much certainty that the defendant may know
what he is called upon to answer, and th~ court
8
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how to render judgment. In other words, substantial justice should be more sought after than
artificial nicety. The defendant, whether he be
guilty or innocent, if he understands the English
language, cannot fail to have understood when
the indictment was read to him that by it he is
charged with the embezzlement of $9,000, the
property of Lucy J. Hill."
POINT II

THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL AND IN
ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
The heart of the appellant's second point is the
argument that he could not have misappropriated the
Budge payment because he was his own boss and accountable to no one. The idea is that this was a "oneman corporation" and appellant was the· man;· consequently, the only duty he owed with respect to these
funds was a duty to himself.
The record shows that the Valley Motor Company
was organized under the incorporation provisions of the
laws of Utah and received its charter on January 8,
1954. The appellant was one of the original promoters
(R. 37). He was present at the first meeting of the
stockholders and the first meeting of the board of directors. He was president of the corporation and one of
its directors (R. 42). For more than a year, the corporation, through the appellant and its other officers
and agents, carried on the business of an automobile
agency, entering into numerous contractual arrangements both with the public and with other corporations.

9
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Throughout that time, its share-holders, including the
appellant, enjoyed all the benefits and advantages of
doing business by the corporate form of organization.
He now seeks by his argument to deny the corporation's
existence and to place himself in the role of an individual proprietor, or at most, a partner, unfettered by
the statutes governing the management of corporate
affairs. The cases hold that he is estopped from doing
so. He cannot run with the hare and bark with the
hounds.

The record contradicts the appellant's claim that
there was no evidence at the trial of fraudulent intent
on his part. Following is part of the direct examination
of Clair Lundberg, a prosecution witness:
"THE COURT: * * * Go ahead, Mr. Lundberg. What did you say and what did Mr. Stites
say~

"A. I said, 'What did you do with the $2,000
from Bob Budge'' And he said, 'I took that to
cover another fictitious deal.'
"Q. Another fictitious deaH
"A. Yes."
(R. 104)
And, on

eros~

examination:

'' Q. Do
tious deal~

~·ou

know what he meant by a ficti-

''A. I assumed there were other deals where
money had been taken from the company.

10
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'' Q. So you don't know what he meant when
he said he took the money to cover another
fictitious deal1

''A. I assumed there had been other fictitious
deals. He said, 'I took that money to cover another fictitious deal.'

''Q. For whom1
''A. You ask him. I don't know.''
(R. 104, 107)
Wayne Craw testified similarly:
'' Q. Did you hear Mr. Lundberg ask Mr.
Stites the question of what he had done with the
$2,000 of the Budge transaction 1

''A. Yes, sir.
'' Q. What was his answer, to your recollec-

tion?
"A. The same as was given by Mr. Lundberg. That was a true statement.

"Q. What was that statement 1
"A. 'I used that check to cover another fictitious deal.' "
(R. 110-111)
Jay C. Howell also testified to the defendant's admissions:

"Q. Now in regard to this conversation that
was up in this office at this date, did you have a
conversation with Mr. Stites in regard to funds
missing from the corporation~
"A. That's right.
"Q. Would you state in words or effect, as
11
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near as you can, what you said to Mr. Stites and
what Mr. Stites said to you in respect to that
matter~

*

*

*

"A. I asked Webb, 'Webb, you say we've
been short of money.' I says, 'The reason that
we've been short of money recently is because of
poor business practices, or because you've taken
it for your own use~' He didn't reply. He put
his head down in his hands like that (indicating)
and remained for two or three minutes; and finally he came on up and he said, 'We've made some
poor deals,' and he says, 'I've used the money.'
(R. 131-132)
Clair Lundberg was recalled by the defendant and
testified in part as follows :
"Dr. Budge called me on the phone and at the
time that he called-He didn't call me personally.
He called the office and I think I was about the
only one around to answer the phone. He said,
'I have a statement for $2,000, of which I have
paid. What does it mean~' And I said, 'I don't
know what it means,' and he said, 'I paid that
account to Mr. Stites.' This was after the conversation we have had with Webb, and I asked
him at that time what happened with Dr. Budge's
account. And Dr. Bob said, 'I paid it to Webb.'
And I said, 'I understand that you paid it to
Webb," because Webb said that he had taken
the check and applied it on the fictitious deal that
I mentioned yesterday, and that's the reason I
understood it had been paid.''
(R. 145)
POINT III
TES'l1 IMONY THAT APPELLANT WAS ARMED
WAS NOT IMPROPER.
12
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During the examination of prosecution witnesses
with respect to the appellant's admissions, quoted under
Point II, defense counsel interposed numerous objections. In the ensuing discussions between the court and
counsel on the merits of those objections, the court
stated that if there were any evidence that the statements were coerced or that the defendant was in any
manner intimidated, the testimony would be excluded
(R. 100, 103). In order to rebut any inference of duress
or intimidation, the district attorney asked his witness
whether, at the time the admissions were made, anyone
in the room was armed (R. 124). The witness answered
that the defendant was armed and the matter was
dropped insofar as the jury was concerned. There is
no evidence that the question was not asked in good
faith or that the district attorney knew what answer
he would receive. For all that appears, the defendant
carried a gun everyday and had a permit to do so. As
a precaution against error, however, the court directed
that the answer be stricken and admonished the jury to
disregard it. The statement was not inflammatory and
there is no showing that the defendant was prejudiced.
There was no basis for granting a mistrial or a new trial.
State v. Bechtold, 48 S.Dak. 219, 203 N.W. 511; Harkins
v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 440, 172 P. 469.
POINT IV
TESTIMONY OF APPELLANT'S ADMISSIONS
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
The appellant's statements testified to by Craw,
Lundberg and Howell were admissions, not confessions.
13
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State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572,83 P. 2d 1010; People v.
Skinner, 123 Cal. App. 2d 741, 267 P. 2d 875. As such,
they were relevant and competent to prove one or more
elements of the offense. State v. White, 107 Utah 84, 152
P. 2d 80. There is no basis for the argument that these
witnesses \Yere accomplices.
POINT V
THE COPY OF CORPORATION MINUTES WAS
ADMISSIBLE.
The attorney for the Valley Motor Company testified that he prepared an agenda of business drawn up
in the form of minutes and that each item of business
on the agenda, with some changes, was passed upon by
the board of directors at a meeting attended by all the
directors (R. 120). He testified that the original copies
used at the directors' meeting could not be found but
that the copy introduced in Exhibit 1 was a true copy
of the action taken by the board.
Fletcher in his Cyclopedia· Corporations, Volume 9,
Sections 4613, 4623, states that where there is a showing
that originals of corporation documents are lost, destroyed, or otherwise not producible, secondary evidence
is admissible to prove their contents; and if it be argued
that the original copies themselves had not been signed
by the corporation officers, then the rule announced by
this Court in CojJJHY J{ing .Jlining Company ·r. Hauson,
52 Utah 605, 176 P. 623, would seem to apply. To use
the language of that opinion:
"* * * It is true no record was made of that
meeting, but tlw artion or proceedings were shown
14
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by oral testimony at the hearing, which may be
done in a proper case. 'Any act of the directors
may be proven by oral testimony, when it is
shown that no record was made of such action,
or when it is shown that if such record was made
it has been lost.' ''
This view finds support in Fletcher, supra, Section 2190,
where it is stated that signing of corporate minutes is
not essential to their validity and force as evidence.
To the same effect is Jones Commentaries on Evidence, Second Edition, Section 778. In discussing the
best evidence rule with respect to corporate acts and
records, he states :
''Questions as to the effect of the omission of
a corporation to record its corporate acts frequently arise in determining the admissibility of
parol evidence to prove such acts. The records
of a corporation are prima facie evidence of its
organization and subsequent proceedings. When
such records exist, they are the best evidence,
and the rules of evidence require their production. But all the acts of a corporation need not
be established by positive record evidence. Where
the records of a corporation are omitted entirely,
or where they are so carelessly or imperfectly
kept as not to show the adopti_on of resolutions or
other acts of the corporation, parol evidence may
be admitted to show that such resolutions were
adopted, or that such acts were done, by the
governing body, unless the law or the charter expressly and imperatively requires all matters to
appear of record, and makes the record the only
evidence. * * * ''
But assuming the minutes to have been improperly
admitted, the appellant was not prejudiced thereby.

15
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The unauthenticated minutes contained nothing pertinent to this case which was not testified to by prosecution
witnesses (R. 35-46, 49-51), or admitted by appellant
through his counsel (R. 52-57). He complains, however,
that the jury may have inferred from the minutes that
he himself was not in sole control of the corporation. As
a matter of law, he was not in sole control (Point II,
supra) and the jury was so instructed (Instruction No.
4).
POINT VI
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
CORRECTLY STATED THE LAW.
The statute in question in this case makes wilful
misapplication of corporate funds a felony. Its effect
is to insure the use of corporate funds for corporate purposes. It is beyond argument that payment of corporate
creditors is one of the fundamental purposes of laws
governing the disposition of corporate funds.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER.
Attorney General
I{. ROGER BEAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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